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Abstract
In A Common Faith, Dewey rejects organized religion and belief in the supernatural, instead arguing for an authentically “religious” attitude which this interpretive
essay analyzes in terms of four propositions: 1) Knowledge is unified. 2) Knowledge
is democratic. 3) The pursuit of moral ideals requires moral faith. 4) The authority
for moral ideals is experience as explored via inquiry. The author responds from
the perspective of his own religious faith and outlines conceptual relationships with
modern spirituality in education writers. The common ground is that the “religious”
must be seen as a significant way of being and becoming in education.
American philosopher John Dewey (1897), articulating his beliefs about education
in “My Pedagogic Creed,” concludes with these words:
I believe, finally, that the teacher is engaged, not simply in the training
of individuals, but in the formation of the proper social life.
I believe that every teacher should realize the dignity of his calling; that
he is a social servant set apart for the maintenance of proper social order
and the securing of the right social growth.
I believe that in this way the teacher always is the prophet of the true
God and the usherer in of the true kingdom of God. (p. 95)

Given that Dewey moved steadily away from organized religion during his life,
what does he mean by this rather dramatic closing statement? Who is the “true
God”? What is the “true kingdom of God”? And what does it mean for a teacher
to be a “prophet”?
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The answers to these questions are found in his work, A Common Faith (1934).
Though this book has been criticized, mostly in passing, its ideas and arguments
have only rarely been analyzed. Scholars tend to summarize A Common Faith and
Dewey’s thoughts on religion briefly on their way elsewhere. Only a handful of articles in the past fifteen years or so have expended significant effort on A Common
Faith (including Noddings, 2009), and I would argue that none of them have made
explicating the specifics of Dewey’s positions and arguments a top priority. One of
the intended contributions of this essay is thus a more substantial exploration of
the details of Dewey’s thinking in this area.
In this slim volume, Dewey (1934) works to set up a middle way through what
he sees as an oppositional gulf between traditional organized religion and modern
advances in science (p. 28). This middle way he calls “religious”—some today might
call it “spiritual.” The religious is characterized by a rejection of creeds, doctrines,
rituals, and other elements of organized religion. Instead, an authentically religious
attitude or orientation is existential and humanist. Moral faith rests not upon a divine Supreme Being or divinely revealed truths, but upon the dynamic potential
of inquiry to discover knowledge and pursue ideals, that is, to act on experiential
knowledge in order to improve life. In education, such issues are marginalized
within current educational policy discussions, which emphasize more quantifiable matters such as achievement gaps in standardized test scores and the value
of college degrees as socioeconomic credentials. Even so, many view a generalized
spirituality—which I will describe as akin though not identical to Dewey’s idea of
the religious—as a neglected but essential element of learning in schools. This can
be seen, for example, in a recent special theme section (six articles in all) in Teachers
College Record entitled “Present to Possibility: The Classroom as a Spiritual Space”
(Miller, 2009), as well as in the work of several writers mentioned later in this essay.
With regard to terminology, it must be noted that Dewey (1934) himself used
the word “spiritual” only a handful of times in A Common Faith, never prominently.
In context, his uses of spiritual suggest a variety of nontechnical meanings and associations, including “immaterial,” “moral,” “aesthetic,” and “sacred.” Nonetheless,
as will be seen, current use of the term spiritual, especially by some spirituality in
education writers, interrelates well with key elements of Dewey’s idea of the religious
as discussed here. So while this essay does not assume religious and spiritual mean
the same, a strong conceptual connection is outlined between Dewey’s idea of the
religious and modern descriptions of the spiritual in education.
There is discontinuity as well, however. With regard to both spirituality and
religion in education, it is worth returning to Dewey’s ideas and arguments because he identifies key issues and takes a stand on them, even or especially if they
are controversial. Current spirituality in education writers, on the other hand,
tend to avoid such bold encounters, preferring a more ecumenical or inclusive approach. For example, as will be seen, Dewey rejects belief in the supernatural, and
his rejection is accompanied by reasons, illustrations, analysis, and consequences.
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Whether or not a supernatural world exists is obviously a significant issue, yet one
rarely finds modern spirituality in education writers taking a definite position regarding it, much less discussing such a position in depth. From my perspective, one
of the effects of such opacity is to mask diversity and blunt the meaningfulness of
potential dialogue.
The central purpose of this essay, then, is to analyze Dewey’s understudied
A Common Faith and from it to take the measure of his arguments regarding the
religious. The importance of doing so is found primarily but not only in the concepts themselves. In addition, several critical responses to Dewey are made from
my own perspective as a religious (specifically, evangelical Christian) believer, and
these movements toward dialogue also hold value. Finally, both the exposition and
the critiques are significant in light of the relative absence of Deweyan religious or
spiritual priorities from current mainstream discourse on education. Conceptual
relationships are outlined between Dewey’s description of the religious and current
descriptions of spirituality in education in order to highlight the ongoing significance of these issues. The foundational argument is that Dewey is working with
important insights, chief among them the belief that human beings are moral and
spiritual beings, and consequently, that learning and education are best pursued in
ways that seek to understand and respect these qualities and dimensions of human
nature and experience. Given that the religious or spiritual currently hovers at the
fringes of education policy and practice (as opposed to being widely understood or
respected), this essay is a timely call to reinvigorate education with these important
and meaningful themes.

Brief Background
Dewey scholars have chronicled a shift in his thinking about religion, namely,
Christianity—as the religion with which he was by far most familiar—during the
late 1880s and early 1890s (Wirth, 1965; Rockefeller, 1991). While at the University of Michigan, he joined a liberal Congregationalist church (the denomination
in which he had been raised), worked actively with the Student Christian Association, and taught Bible classes at his church. During this time, he attempted to
keep his ideas within the fold of organized religion, for example, by interpreting
Hegel as parallel in meaning with Christian theology. Over the years, however,
Dewey moved away from traditional Christianity toward a more secular humanistic viewpoint—variously referred to as scientific humanism (Wirth, 1965), democratic humanism, religious humanism (Rockefeller, 1991), pragmatic humanism,
or existential humanism (Noddings, 1993).
Even as he gradually abandoned organized religion, however, Dewey did not
reject the idea of the religious but instead worked to extract such an idea from what
he saw as the outdated burdens of ritual and dogma: “While he relinquished an
orthodox religious orientation, he [continued] to insist on the prime importance of
the spiritual and religious quality of experience” (Wirth, 1965, p. 267). As he says
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in a letter, one of his main purposes in writing A Common Faith was to reach out
to people who felt attracted to the spirit of religion but not to organized religion itself: “My book was written for the people who feel inarticulately that they have the
essence of the religious with them and yet are repelled by the religions” (quoted in
Webster, 2009, p. 622).

Dewey’s Rejection of Belief in the Supernatural
Dewey’s (1934) first and perhaps most significant move in defining religious is a
rejection of the supernatural. He aims to keep religious values while getting rid of
the untenable baggage of supernatural beliefs. To him, as to many others before and
since, it is simply obvious that belief in the supernatural is not credible in the modern world (p. 30). It is in fact an “encumbrance” and the “genuinely religious” needs
“purification” or “emancipation” (p. 8) from it in order to grow and develop in ways
benefiting humanity (p. 2). He appears to argue for the discarding of this belief in
two ways: First, because religions around the world vary considerably in their conception of a supernatural realm and people’s relationship to it, he concludes that the
“supernatural” must be a socially generated concept rather than actual fact (pp. 3-6).
If the supernatural were real, he reasons, there would be more similarities and cohesiveness in how religions conceive and describe it. The bottom line is that “there is no
such thing as religion in the singular. There is only a multitude of religions” (p. 7).
Second, Dewey (1934) suggests that belief in the supernatural, as a socially
generated concept, stems from past human inability to understand or explain natural phenomena (pp. 13, 56-57). Given the modern discoveries of science and the
tools of scientific inquiry, humanity no longer needs recourse to the supernatural
for explanatory purposes. This is not to say that everything has been explained or
that humanity will ever reach a state in which everything has been explained, but
that we now know enough to put our faith in the ability of scientific inquiry to bring
about a growing comprehension of presently mysterious phenomena.
Dewey remained committed to these views in later years (Rockefeller, 1991).
In his contribution to a symposium on “Religion and the Intellectuals” in The Partisan Review (Dewey, 1950), for example, he repeats several points from A Common
Faith, prominently including rejection of belief in the supernatural. Concluding
his essay, he asks: “Assuming that in the past religions nourished certain vital human values, can these values now be maintained without a widespread belief in
the supernatural?” (p. 394). Answering in the affirmative, he argues that insofar as
religious beliefs in the supernatural have been “the source of violent conflict, and
destructive of basic human values,” such beliefs must now be abandoned if more
humanistic “religious values” are to grow and flourish: “Freedom from it [belief in
the supernatural] will provide an opportunity for a religious experience to develop
that is deeply and pervasively human and humane” (p. 394).
How persuasive are Dewey’s arguments for rejecting belief in the supernatural? We perhaps find a hint in Noddings’s (2009) description of A Common Faith
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as “arguably one of John Dewey’s least effective books” (p. 12). In Dewey’s first argument above, it is curious that he takes diversity to be evidence against a belief,
since elsewhere in his philosophy he finds multiplicity and diversity to be in general
positive and productive (Meinhart, 2002). Furthermore, although he contends that
inconsistencies and contradictions are all that world religions have in common—
“the differences among them are so great and so shocking that any common element that can be extracted is meaningless” (Dewey, 1934, p. 8)—he nonetheless
goes on to distill the meaning of religious out of the domain of organized religion.
Noting this apparent contradiction, Noddings (2009) points out that sociologists
and other scholars generally reject this claim and feel quite confident in identifying certain elements of religion in general, including but not limited to belief in the
supernatural (pp. 12-13).
With reference to Dewey’s second argument against belief in the supernatural, his historical account of such beliefs as necessitated by ignorance concerning
natural phenomena seems disingenuous. It implies that the sole or primary social
function of organized religion is to explain the presently unexplainable. This is by no
means a given, not even from an anthropological or sociological standpoint, much
less from the insider perspectives of religions themselves. Beyond the idea of religion’s potential explanatory power, religious believers have provided and continue
to provide a variety of grounds for belief in a supernatural world (for contemporary
examples, see Craig, 2008). Furthermore, there is nothing about scientific understanding that would necessarily displace the idea of the supernatural. That is, unless
belief in the supernatural consists only in belief in certain explanations of natural
phenomena, which it does not, or unless the “natural” is posited to encompass all
of existence, which begs the question, no amount of scientific knowledge or explanation would logically require disbelief in a supernatural realm. So it appears that
Dewey, in saying that new knowledge has superseded old beliefs and thus that belief
in the supernatural is no longer credible, is working from prima facie assumptions
rather than crafting arguments as such. In addition, it must be noted that his rejection of the supernatural was neither original nor, from an academic perspective,
extreme. Even so, Dewey’s identification of this issue as essential in his extraction
of the religious from religion is important, as it remains to the present day at the
heart of many religious-secular worldview differences.

Dewey’s Idea of the “Religious”
From this starting point, then, what does Dewey mean by “religious”? Once the
religious has been freed from supernatural beliefs and their stultifying baggage,
what remains? More than a decade before writing A Common Faith, Dewey (1922)
had, in Human Nature and Conduct, already begun to outline his later answers to
these questions:
Religion has lost itself in cults, dogmas and myths. Consequently the office of religion as sense of community and one’s place in it has been lost . . .
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Religion as a sense of the whole is the most individualized of all things,
the most spontaneous, undefinable and varied. For individuality signifies
unique connections in the whole. Yet it has been perverted into something
uniform and immutable. It has been formulated into fi xed and defined
beliefs expressed in required acts and ceremonies. Instead of marking the
freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite whole, it
has been petrified into a slavery of thought and sentiment. (pp. 330-331)

In other words, organized religion as a social institution is missing the point and has
become bogged down in creeds, doctrines, and scriptures. Rather than “cults, dogmas and myths . . . acts and ceremonies,” the genuinely “religious” is about a “sense
of the whole” and especially “the individual as a member of an infinite whole.” That
is to say, the real point of religion is or should be the relationships among people
(both as individuals and in community) and the universe, including the proper
ends of such relationships.
This emphasis emerges more clearly and in more developed form in A Common Faith. Dewey (1934) here conceives of the religious as signifying and embodying harmony and wholeness within and among individuals, communities, and the
universe in general (pp. 18-20). It is both an inner and an outer reality: “The self is
always directed toward something beyond itself and so its own unification depends
upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe” (p. 19). The universe is in turn “the embodiment
for sense and thought of that encompassing scope of existence the intellect cannot
grasp. It is the matrix within which our ideal aspirations are born and bred. It is the
source of the values that the moral imagination projects as directive criteria and
as shaping purposes” (p. 85). From this vantage point, authentic religious faith is
understood to be morally purposeful, nothing less than “the unification of the self
through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to
which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices” (p.
33). To paraphrase, people are truly religious if they pursue higher purposes which
are inherently worthy and compelling enough to unify their identities and govern
their actions. Such purposes lie beyond what the intellect alone can grasp and belong instead to the moral imagination, which might be seen as an amalgamation
of vision, conscience, and empathy. “Such a faith,” concludes Dewey, “has always
been implicitly the common faith of mankind” (p. 87).
Dewey’s conception of the religious is certainly “not easy to understand”
(Noddings, 2009, p. 13). Perhaps this is why little extended analysis of it has been
done. Unpacking Dewey’s idea of the religious in this section of the essay, I suggest
that it can be portrayed as having four main characteristics or requiring agreement with four main propositions. These four propositions underlie his concept of
the religious and constitute an interpretive analysis of the main ideas in A Common Faith (Dewey, 1934), occasionally enhanced by references to other of Dewey’s
works. First, knowledge is unified. Ideally, knowledge can be and should be one
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body. Forms of knowledge should not be separated from one another (pp. 34-35).
The scientific and the religious should not be regarded as divided—as, to take but
one recent example, within Stephen Jay Gould’s widely known framework of “nonoverlapping magisteria” (NOMA) (Ecklund, 2011)—but rather as joined or overlapping areas for inquiry and understanding. For example, some religious mystical
experiences are susceptible to scientific (that is, physical and material) explanations
(pp. 35-38). The wholeness and oneness of all forms of knowledge are to be apprehended through experience. From Dewey’s perspective, the authentically religious
holds the potential to unify the natural, scientific, moral, and social dimensions of
experience. Once properly understood, “religion would then be found to have its
natural place in every aspect of human experience that is concerned with estimate
of possibilities, with emotional stir by possibilities as yet unrealized, and with all
action in behalf of their realization. All that is significant in human experience falls
within this frame” (p. 57).
Second, knowledge is democratic. That is, knowledge is public and inquiry is
a public process (pp. 39-41). Anyone may call any truth into question at any time
and seek to verify or disprove it. The “supreme loyalty” is not to a fixed body of immutable truths but rather to “the method by which truth is obtained” (p. 39)—that
is, the method of scientific (i.e., rational or intelligent) inquiry. By contrast, Dewey
describes organized religion as resting on “limited and private” knowledge (divine
revelation, mystical experiences) and maintaining power by suppressing democracy and inquiry and promoting fear (divine punishment) (p. 39). A democratic
ideal is subverted by the circular nature of traditional religion’s reasoning (pp. 4041): religious experiences must yield results which fit into previously known religious truths (creeds, doctrines, scriptures). If they do not, they are rejected as not
genuinely religious. So such experiences are either confirmatory or thrown out as
evidence, meaning that they are not testable or verifiable and that the meanings
of such experiences are foreordained and fixed. From Dewey’s perspective, this is
simply wrong. Religious experience must abandon fossilized creedal commitments
and become democratically open to processes of inquiry (like all forms of experience). Only via open inquiry can the deeper, more vital meanings of truly religious
experience be envisioned and discovered.
Tröhler (2000) sees Dewey’s idea of the religious as outlined in A Common
Faith as key to how he viewed democracy working: It addresses key issues of moral
values and individual-community relationships without which democratic societies
could not cohere or move in morally purposeful directions. So just as the religious
needs a democratic process of inquiry in order to be freed from the trap of institutional religion, so also does democracy itself need religious experience, attitudes,
and values in order to flourish.
Third, the pursuit of moral ideals requires moral faith. “Moral faith” is a pragmatic trust in inquiry, process, and experience, as opposed to the “intellectual assent” to creeds and customs required by traditional religions (pp. 21-23). As Dewey
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explains: “Faith in the continued disclosing of truth through directed cooperative
human endeavor is more religious in quality than is any faith in a completed revelation” (p. 26). Such faith is also a commitment to moral principles and ideals that
promote the betterment of self and society. It can and should be sacrificial in the
sense formerly reserved for organized religion: “Any activity pursued in behalf of an
ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality” (p. 27). In fact, if only
people were “actuated throughout the length and breadth of human relations with
the faith and ardor that have at times marked historic religions the consequences
[i.e., social benefits] would be incalculable” (pp. 80-81). One implication of this is
that the religious is not a permanent possession but an evolving process or journey.
In organized religion, according to Dewey (1930), “‘morals’ were conceived as a code
of laws, the same everywhere and at all times. The good life was one lived in fixed
adherence to fixed principles. In contrast with all such beliefs, the outstanding fact in
all branches of natural science is that to exist is to be in process, in change” (p. 271).
Webster (2009) aptly summarizes: “Religion was not to be regarded as something a
person could have but rather as something that a person becomes as a way of living
. . . Religious faith is therefore significant not because it is embedded in knowledge
statements which are ‘true’ but rather they are personally important end-purposes
which determine our conduct and way-of-being in all of our experiences” (p. 624).
Fourth, as previously implied, the authority for moral ideals is experience as explored via inquiry. As elsewhere in Dewey, the term “experience” in A Common Faith
(1934) is a shorthand reference for the various dimensions of interactions among
people and their contexts (e.g., pp. 3, 9, 19). As he explains in Democracy and Education (1916), experience “primarily consists of the active relations subsisting between
a human being and his natural and social surroundings” (pp. 319-320). Experience
is what gives meaning to existence: “In just the degree in which connections are
established between what happens to a person and what he does in response, and
between what he does to his environment and what it does in response to him, his
acts and the things about him acquire meaning” (p. 320). This meaning is authoritative in the sense that experience can provide worthy and compelling purposes and
ideals by which to live. It does so, however, in a way that is more democratic and
open-ended than the authority wielded by organized religion. As Dewey elaborates
in “What I Believe” (1930): “Adherence to any body of doctrines and dogmas based
upon a specific authority signifies distrust in the power of experience to provide, in
its own ongoing movement, the needed principles of belief and action. Faith in its
newer sense signifies that experience itself is the sole ultimate authority” (p. 267).
For Dewey, the reason for the qualitative differences between the authority
of organized religion and the authority of experience is the process of scientific inquiry. Such inquiry is the ground of truth. The true loyalty of a religious orientation
is thus to a method of inquiry rather than to a set body of revealed truths (Dewey,
1934, p. 39). Dewey explains: “new methods of inquiry and reflection have become
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for the educated man today the final arbiter of all questions of fact, existence, and
intellectual assent . . . There is but one sure road of access to truth—the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record
and controlled reflection” (pp. 31-32). Dewey is confident that this road leads to
moral values that do not need the support of organized religion: “The validity of
justice, affection, and that intellectual correspondence of our ideas with realities
that we call truth, is so assured in its hold upon humanity that it is unnecessary for
the religious attitude to encumber itself with the apparatus of dogma and doctrine”
(p. 44). The progress of humanity would, in fact, be better served by severing altogether the connection between moral ideals and organized religion: “The opposition between religious values as I conceive them and religions is not to be bridged.
Just because the release of these values is so important, their identification with the
creeds and cults of religions must be dissolved” (p. 28; see also pp. 77-81). In short,
humanity no longer needs faith in gods or God to make sense of experience or to
envision and pursue knowledge and moral ideals. Dewey (1930) thus predicts that
“the future of religion is connected with the possibility of developing a faith in the
possibilities of human experience and human relationships that will create a vital
sense of the solidarity of human interests and inspire action to make that sense a
reality” (pp. 273-274; see also Rockefeller, 1991, pp. 489-490).
In summary, Dewey believed that the authentically religious consists in a belief in the wholeness or oneness of knowledge; a commitment to democracy rather
than hierarchy or authority with regard to determining what counts as knowledge
and truth; a moral faith that is governed not by the socially generated, outdated
dogma and rituals of traditional religion, but rather by a process-driven sense of
the harmony and mystery of the universe and our place in it, and an engagement
with experience and inquiry as the surest foundations for rational thinking and
social progress toward moral ideals.

What Liberating the “Religious” from “Religion” Changes
While rejecting the supernatural and doctrinal content of the vocabulary of organized religion, Dewey does attempt to co-opt or reconstruct this vocabulary in A
Common Faith (1934) and elsewhere. “God” is suggested to mean not a personal,
supernatural, Supreme Being but “the ideal ends that at a given time and place one
acknowledges as having authority over his volition and emotion, the values to which
one is supremely devoted, as far as these ends, through imagination, take on unity”
(p. 42). In the terms of my previous paraphrase, God is a shorthand way of naming
the higher purposes which experience and inquiry reveal—by virtue of their unifying and morally admirable effects—as worthy of our allegiance. Put another way,
God is “a relationship between the actual and the ideal . . . the ongoing creation of
human effort as ideals are acted on in pursuit of desires” (Meinhart, 2002, p. 346).
Dewey (1934) persistently reminds us that ideals require action: “there are forces in
nature and society that generate and support the ideals. They are further unified by
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the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation between
ideal and actual to which I would give the name ‘God’” (p. 51). Thus, God is created
in our image rather than we in his. I agree with McCarthy’s (2002) analysis on this
point: “The traditional ‘God’ concept, the supreme and supernaturally powerful
Being, is eliminated, entirely, from Dewey’s position. What we have, instead, under
the name ‘God,’ turns out to be simply human beings, working intelligently and
cooperatively in the context of natural conditions, to bring cherished ideals into
actuality” (p. 354). Historically speaking, posits Dewey, we have projected onto a
supernatural being all the best qualities in human nature and experience in order to
give them weight and authority. The actual sources of these moral ideals, however,
are not divine but thoroughly human. The fact is that (Dewey, 1934):
all significant ends and all securities for stability and peace have grown up
in the matrix of human relations, and that the values given a supernatural
locus are in fact products of an idealizing imagination that has laid hold of
natural goods . . . [G]oods actually experienced in the concrete relations of
family, neighborhood, citizenship, pursuit of art and science, are what men
actually depend upon for guidance and support, and that their reference
to a supernatural and other-worldly locus has obscured their real nature
and has weakened their force. (pp. 70-71)

According to Dewey, the time has now come when such projections are no longer
useful and ethics that are truly religious can and should be liberated from organized religion (pp. 72-74).
Other traditional religious vocabulary receives similar treatment. “Revelation”
is not supernatural or scriptural but instead signifies the ongoing process of human
inquiry. The revelation of truth is thus necessarily ongoing, unfinished, and partial
(Wirth, 1965, p. 266). “Freedom in Christ” is not a consequence of divine redemption but instead means freedom to pursue such inquiry (Webster, 2009, p. 625). The
“kingdom of God” highlighted at the conclusion of Dewey’s “My Pedagogic Creed”
(1897, p. 95) is not about divine sovereignty or power but instead signifies the moral
ideals motivating a social struggle for human betterment (Webster, 2009, p. 627).
One of Dewey’s motivations for co-opting or reconstructing religious terms in this
way seems to have been to reach out via familiar language to the religious-but-waryof-religion group he perceived as growing more numerous among the American
population (Webster, 2009). He does not actually argue in favor of use of the term
“God,” for example, but only outlines the conception he does in order to assist those
who might find it helpful or less threatening to retain the word: “Use of the words
‘God’ or ‘divine’ to convey the union of actual with ideal may protect man from a
sense of isolation and from consequent despair or defiance” (Dewey, 1934, p. 53).
Dewey’s co-opted or reconstructed use of the language of organized religion
has spurred controversy. Rosenow (1997), for example, accuses Dewey of hijacking religious language or of forcibly hammering round pegs of secular meaning
into square holes of religious terminology. McCarthy (2002) calls Dewey’s stratVolume 27 (2)  2011
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egy “a dangerous process of attempting to put the new wine of scientific thought
into the old bottles of religious rhetoric” (p. 353). Webster (2009) defends Dewey as
not intending to camouflage or deceive, but rather as attempting to convey honest
understandings of the deeper meanings of religious terms (p. 618). By extracting
genuinely religious content from the tradition-encrusted terminology of organized
religion, Dewey aimed to challenge the monopoly he perceived as being claimed by
traditional religions upon religious experience (p. 622).
Once a living religious ideal has been extracted from the dead weight of
organized religion, it will be free, Dewey (1934) argues, to grow and develop and
improve human life. As he describes matters, within the framework of traditional
religion, believers rely on God to act instead of acting themselves, and wait for a
future heaven instead of embracing and working to improve present life and experience: “Men have never fully used the powers they possess to advance the good in
life, because they have waited upon some power external to themselves and to nature to do the work they are responsible for doing” (p. 46; see also Dewey, 1930, p.
268). If God and heaven were removed from consideration, there would be enough
“justice, kindliness, and order so that if it were mobilized for action, not expecting
abrupt and complete transformation to occur, the disorder, cruelty, and oppression
that exist would be reduced” (p. 47). That is, if humanity stopped blaming sin, relying on God, and looking forward to heaven, we would struggle more passionately
and effectively to build a better world in the here and now (pp. 76-78). We would
not settle for less in the present life or focus on the hope of a better life after death,
but instead we would be fully committed in thought, word, and deed to the pursuit
or accomplishment of moral ideals in our daily lives and relationships. Dewey’s argument has thus circled back to the original rejection of belief in the supernatural.
According to Dewey: “The objection to supernaturalism is that it stands in the way
of an effective realization of the sweep and depth of the implications of natural
human relations. It stands in the way of using the means that are in our power to
make radical changes in these relations” (p. 80). In other words, traditional religion’s belief in a supernatural world blocks the road to moral progress and human
betterment in this world.

Responding to Dewey’s Portrayal of Christianity
How fair or accurate is Dewey’s portrayal of organized religion, especially, given
his personal and cultural background, Christianity? This question is significant in
part because of Dewey’s prominence in philosophy and education—when a thinker
this consequential argues such major points, responses are called for. In addition,
evaluating and responding to Dewey’s arguments in A Common Faith is important
because to do so has implications for ongoing debates about such issues as appropriate religious content (if any) in educational curricula, the role (if any) of religion
in the public sphere, and the extent of religious and other freedoms in relation to
concepts such as citizenship and democracy (Noddings, 1993, 2008; Nord, 2010).
E&C  Education and Culture

Common Ground With A Common Faith: Dewey’s Idea of the “Religious”  85
From my perspective as an evangelical Christian, his descriptions or claims regarding organized religion are too often inaccurate or unsatisfactory. While I do not
claim to speak for evangelicals or Christians in general, neither is it true that my
comments in this brief critique are idiosyncratic. My disagreements with Dewey’s
rather monolithic depictions can for the purposes of this essay be discussed under
two headings: the Christian believer’s orientations toward present social life and
toward truth.
First, with regard to the orientation toward present social life, Dewey represents religious believers as putting their hope in a future heaven and being uncommitted to the present. They blame sin for the evils and sufferings of this life and
wait for God to do something about it rather than engaging in the present struggle
for human betterment. Such pie-in-the-sky charges of escapism are not new and
unfortunately there are and have been Christians who match this description. Yet
much of the tide of church doctrine and history runs in the opposite direction. It
is not simply that there are exceptions to the generalization, but that the generalization itself does not appear valid. One need look no further than one of the
opening lines of the Lord’s Prayer, with its appeal that God’s will be done on earth
as it is in heaven (Matthew 6:10). Admired thinkers and activists from Augustine
to William Wilberforce to Martin Luther King, Jr.—not to mention more divisive
and controversial figures such as Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson—have, for better
or worse, engaged in the social issues of their day on the basis of their Christian
faith. Believers, despite Dewey’s portrayal, do not in fact tend to treat this present
life as an irrelevant preface to heaven. Why is this not the case? A life of genuine
faith mandates that believers are never to be satisfied with “intellectual assent” to
creeds and doctrines, but rather understand their faith as something to be lived out
day by day. Sin is indeed a moral and spiritual factor at work in human experience,
yet responses of faith include not only “waiting upon God” to act in the future but
also actively struggling for goodness and justice in the here and now. This is not to
say that all that is done in the name of religion or faith accomplishes such ideals,
nor that Christian believers always agree on specific social issues. The point here
is that Dewey’s depiction of Christianity and the behavior of Christian believers is
often curiously blind to both doctrine and history. The Christian motif of journey
or pilgrimage suggests that believers are or should be energetically engaged with
present realities. Christian religious faith, like the moral faith described by Dewey,
is not passive pie-in-the-sky but vitally involves the present pursuit of moral and
spiritual ideals in relationships with others and with the created world.
Second, with regard to the issue of orientation toward truth, Dewey represents religious believers as blindly or passively receiving a fi xed body of divinely
revealed dogma. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, the receiving of divine
revelation is hardly passive. Intellectual assent is insufficient—active agreement
of the heart and will are also called for in ways that are intended to transform
individuals and communities in both the present and the future. Furthermore,
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revelation is not exhaustive, that is, religious believers do not see it as covering all
possible knowledge. Reason and inquiry thus have key parts to play in relation to
learning and knowledge. While faith and reason might exist in tension or paradox, there is no intention for them to part company. Apologists from the Apostle
Paul in Athens (Acts 17) to philosopher William Lane Craig (2008) have argued
rational grounds for religious belief. In addition, while Christianity does indeed
rest on a foundation of authoritative divine revelation, that revelation is not above
inquiry or investigation. To take just one example, canonization of Scripture is an
area of Christian religious scholarship within which historical, cultural, theological,
and textual concerns surrounding how we got our Bible are studied and debated.
Within the fold of organized Christianity, there is room for process, experience,
interpretation, contextualization, and even doubt—it has been said that doubt is
faith with the courage to ask difficult questions. (This is not to say that all Christians are comfortable talking this way.)
In the end, if Dewey argued that the religious must be extracted or liberated
from traditional religion, then I am suggesting that the two should be, as it were,
put back together. Dewey rests his faith upon inquiry and experience, but inquiry
and experience can tell different and perhaps irreconcilable tales, depending on
who is doing the telling, how, when, where, why, to whom, and what assumptions
and interpretive lenses are brought to bear. For Dewey to argue that inquiry and
experience are sufficient in themselves to lead humanity on a journey of moral and
social progress is from my perspective at best a leap of faith.

Common Ground: Spirituality in Education
At the beginning of this essay, I framed its central purpose as analyzing A Common Faith—thus my efforts to develop a nuanced exposition of Dewey’s idea of the
religious. I also indicated that my responses to Dewey’s positions would in some
regards be critical, given that I remain committed to the sorts of traditional religious beliefs he rejects. Yet it is my hope that the final emphasis of this essay may
be found in the “common ground” of the title. While my critiques might help set
an agenda for meaningful discussion and debate, what is vitally important is that
despite everything, common ground does exist between Dewey and religious believers. Genuine conversations need common ground.
One major dimension of the common ground is that human beings are moral
and spiritual beings, and we ignore these dimensions at our peril, especially in processes of learning and education. Being religious or spiritual is a valid and significant way of being and becoming both in and out of the classroom, and spiritual
aspects of experience are sure to be present, whether acknowledged or not, in all
learning endeavors. A second key aspect of the common ground is that knowledge
is unified. To build walls between sacred and secular or between religious and scientific or even between natural and supernatural—despite their potential usefulness as cognitive categories—is to set up false and misleading dichotomies. One
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practical effect seems to me to be that religion and spirituality are often ghettoized
or kept out of mainstream educational discussions. In any case, although I, unlike
Dewey, do not see experience as able to bear the weight of faith or as possessing
moral authority in and of itself, experience does play a key role in revealing and
teaching truth not only to Deweyan humanists but to Christian believers as well:
as discussed above, religious beliefs are not truly knowable to believers until they
are put into practice in daily life.
These areas of agreement also build common ground with theorists of spirituality in education, at least some of whom appear directly or indirectly to follow in
the footsteps of Dewey. Qualitative researchers such as those working in the area of
children’s spirituality, for example, continue the project of describing the religious
in humanist and existential terms rather than from the perspective of organized
religion. Schoonmaker (2009)—whose article is in the special issue of Teachers College Record referenced earlier (Miller, 2009)—writes that “spirituality refers to a way
of being that includes the capacity of humans to see beyond ourselves, to become
more than we are, to see mystery and wonder in the world around them, and to
experience private and collective moments of awe, wonder, and transcendence” (p.
2714). One can see here emphases on the relationships and interactions among individual, society, and natural world; on the role of the imagination in envisioning
“inclusive ideal ends” that can make us “more than we are”; and on the quality of
moral faith that is committed to process and inquiry above all. To draw out such
conceptual connections is not to argue for a linear philosophical inheritance, much
less to provide a complete overview of the spirituality in education literature, but
rather to continue the exploration of Dewey’s (1934) hypothesis that meaningful
“religious” faith is “the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal
ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as
worthy of controlling our desires and choices” (p. 33). Or, in my paraphrase, people
are religious if they pursue higher purposes which are inherently worthy and compelling enough to unify their identities and govern their actions.
The affinities among Dewey’s idea of the religious and current spirituality in
education writers can be seen using examples suggested by three of the four propositions discussed in this essay. First, the idea that knowledge is unified is part of what
undergirds the work of Palmer (1993, 1998). He argues against divisions in knowledge and sees inquiry and morality as joined: “I have come to see that knowledge
contains its own morality, that it begins not in a neutrality but in a place of passion
within the human soul. Depending on the nature of that passion, our knowledge
will follow certain courses and head toward certain ends” (1993, p. 7). He is also
concerned with the relationships and interactions among individuals and their communities, especially their professional communities: “By spiritual I mean the diverse
ways we answer the heart’s longing to be connected with the largeness of life—a
longing that animates love and work, especially the work called teaching” (1998, p.
5). In authentic teaching and learning, he argues, there is a wholeness of knowledge.
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Second, the idea that knowledge is democratic is reflected in the writing of
Block (2007, 2009), who explicitly agrees with Dewey about the “symbiotic” links
among education, teaching, and the moral and spiritual underpinnings of democracy (2007, p. 87). While current educational reforms emphasize standardized testing and individual proficiency, for instance, “it is to the development of individual
potential in the context of social responsibility to which the democratic classroom
in a democracy must give voice and not to the progress of the individual at the
expense of the welfare and care of others” (2007, p. 49). Again: “Dewey believed
that it was not knowledge that the schools must seek to develop, but the capacity
for wisdom and responsibility. This effort required the acquisition of knowledge
[through inquiry]” (2009, p. 53). In Block’s vision as in Dewey’s, then, education and
democracy are essentially religious endeavors for the purpose of human betterment.
Third, the idea that the authority for moral ideals is experience as explored via
inquiry is seen in Brown (2008). She claims that every teacher brings their religion
into their lessons—not in the sense of organized religion, but in a more Deweyan
sense:
If one understands religion as it functions—as symbols, stories, institutions, ethics, values, and practices that make life meaningful—then any
teacher of the humanities, and to a certain extent the social and natural
sciences, brings his or her religion into the classroom. Through what teachers choose to include and emphasize and what we choose to exclude and
de-emphasize, we display our view of the world and what we value. Further,
through how we interact with students and the qualities of our relationships
with them, we not only display our view of the world but also create it. (p. x)

In her narrative, it is clear that the “symbols, stories, institutions, ethics, values,
and practices that make life meaningful” are not the fi xed creeds and burdensome
rituals of organized religion, but rather that they represent a transmutation of such
religion into existentially meaningful religious values and ideals. Since “how we
interact with our students and the qualities of our relationships with them” are a
key dimension of this, she recounts Buddhist parables as frames for her explorations of building community in the classroom. These parables and explorations
persistently return to themes of process, inquiry, experience, moral faith, and the
relationships and interactions among persons, communities, and the universe or
natural world. It is no accident that her book flows from a course entitled Buddhism
and the Environment.
A notable exception to these affinities or thematic threads is the fact that few
current spirituality in education writers directly reject belief in the supernatural, as
Dewey did. An exception is Garrison (2011), who identifies himself as a “Deweyan
naturalist” and begins defining spirituality in the same way, by rejecting the supernatural: “I do not believe in the supernatural, simply the natural that we do not yet
comprehend and perhaps never will.” The writers cited above, however, write out
of, respectively, Christian (namely, Quaker or Friends), Jewish, and Buddhist tradiE&C  Education and Culture
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tions. There are also, of course, spirituality in education scholars who work from an
avowedly secular or religiously agnostic perspective, such as Nash (2002). His approach to spirituality sounds humanist and existential, akin to Dewey’s idea of the
religious: “Spirituality is the name I give to the never-ending struggle that for each
one of us is inescapable: the need to provide satisfying answers to life’s most insistent questions about meaning” (p. 20). He agreed with a graduate student who told
him: “Your work as an educator is actually a religious vocation because it gives you
a sense of transcendence. Your church is the university. Your sacrament is teaching.
Your community of saints is made up of your students. And your prayer is when
you carry on intense, revitalizing, give-and-take conversations in the classroom”
(p. 5). Or, in Dewey’s similarly co-opted words: “The teacher always is the prophet
of the true God and the usherer in of the true kingdom of God.”

Dewey’s Idea of the “Religious” in Schools
Though Dewey does not discuss teachers or schools at length in A Common Faith,
education and a Deweyan spirituality have come to be linked and intertwined in
part because schools are an obvious social location in which moral and spiritual issues and ideals might be explored and addressed without promoting one organized
religion over another (Noddings, 1993, 2008). Webster (2009) explains that Dewey
promoted people’s “right to exercise their own intelligence in all of their activities
through a new kind of faith which looked to experience rather than institutional
authorities as the assumed guardians of entry to another realm. This emancipation
is to be fostered by teachers through a democratic approach to education” (p. 625).
Noddings (2009) frames this goal as “how to get people to think, reflect, and analyze
without insulting them or the traditions they treasure” (p. 18). She does not think
religious believers must necessarily give up their creeds and rituals to do this—or
to put it in the language of A Common Faith, she is unconvinced that the religious
must be, though it certainly can be, emancipated from organized religion. As an
example, Noddings (2008, 2009) suggests that students might be assigned to read
The Creation (Wilson, 2006), which is written as a letter from the secular humanist
author to a Southern Baptist pastor. Though their perceptions and beliefs regarding
the natural world are very different, the writer suggests that perhaps they can agree
to work together to preserve it.
The point of raising religious or spiritual issues in schools is to promote reflection and inquiry on significant questions: students must get the message that spiritual ideals and values are important, and they must feel free and equipped to make
informed choices concerning them. Teachers would obviously play a key role in this
process. Little wonder, then, that Dewey (1897) calls teachers to be “the prophet[s]
of the true God and the usherer[s] in of the true kingdom of God” (p. 95). So, what
is this “true kingdom”? It is an understanding of what is authentic and necessary,
and what is unnecessary and even harmful, about institutional religion as compared to genuinely religious values, actions, and ideals. This includes a commitment
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not to religious dogma but to the role of experience and inquiry in individual and
social life. And what does it mean to be a “prophet” of such a “kingdom”? It is to
invite, summon, and exhort others to heed and participate in this understanding.
Finally, who or what is the “true God”? It is not a personal Supreme Being who has
revealed truths such as heaven, but higher moral and spiritual purposes which are
inherently worthy and compelling enough to unify human identities and govern
our actions in this present life. This is Dewey’s idea of the religious and part of his
vision for human progress.
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